Wh~y do governments encourage improvements in transaction efficiency?
Governments have been very active in engaging in and in encouraging the improvements in transaction efficiency, including the provision of legal, social, and economic infrastructures. (For the effects of infrastructure on productivity, see World bank 1994 for a survey; see also Boserup 198 1 and Chandler 1990 on the historical perspmtive and the importance of population size.) Even free-market economists including Adarn Smith find 'the erection and maintenance of the public works which facilitate the commerce of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable canals, harbours, &c' desirable and indeed find this as 'evident without any proof (Smith 177611976, 11, p.245) . Perhaps this apparently self-evident nature made econo,mists pay little attention to the role of infrastructure in either theoretical or empirical studies until the late 1980's when Aschauer (1989) Zou 1994 , Easterly 1993 , Evans & Karras 1994 , Holtz-Eakin 1994 , La Ferrara 2001 . While these issues are also related to the theme of this paper, the latter is more concemed with the specific point as to the reasons why the involvement of the government is needed.
The need for government involvement may be explained by the public goods nature of infrastructure. This may well be the major part of the explanation for many cases. However, if this is the only reason, there is little reason for encou~ragement if the items involved are excludable and can be priced as applicable in many cases including communications. Moreover, according to the traditional analysis, even for non-excludable items, there should be no reason for providing them beyond the levels indicated by the equation of (aggregate) marginal benefits and marginal costs, evaluated at the existing structure of economic organizations or the degree of specialization of the whole economy (which is not taken as a variable in the traditional analysis). In this paper, it is argued that, if we take the degree of specialization as endogenous, the provision of infrastructures that decreases transaction costs may produce some indirect network externality. This should be distinguished from the possible network externality of the infrastructure itself, which is well known. For example, the usehlness of a telephone, fax machines, email facility increases as more people are on the phone, etc. This is the direct network externality, which we shall abstract away. Rather, we refer to the following more indirect effects.
The improvement in transaction (including communication and transportation) efficiency may generate benefits in excess of the direct private benefits through the promotion of higher degree of specialization. If transaction efficiency is very low (i.e. transaction costs are very high), it may be optimal for everyone to be in autarky, self-producing all goods needed. As transaction efficiency improves, it may becomes optimal to buy some goods from others and sell the good one specializes in, but in general still have some goods self-produced and selfconsumed (which exist even in modem times, including home cooking, cleaning, and gardening). As transaction efficiency improves, the set of goods bought from others increases. Thus, the benefits of an improvement in transaction efficiency is not only directly in reducing the costs of transaction, but also in indirectly promoting the degree of specialization and the consequent tapping of the economies of specialization. Even assuming that the costs of exclusion is negligible and that there is no fibee-rider problem, a private producer of an improvement in infrastructure that reduces transaction costs may only be able to capture the direct benefits of lowing transaction costs, but not be able to capture the indirect benefits of promoting more specialization (even in the absence of individual differences giving rise to different consumer surpluses). People will just assess the benefits of lower transaction costs given the existing level of specialization of the economy. Not only that the benefits through a higher degree of specialization will occur only in the future contingent on the appearance of new marketable goods, but also this development is taken as not affected by the improvement in the transaction efficiency of an individual herself. It is thus rational even under full knowledge to ignore the indirect benefit of higher transi~ction efficiency on the level of specialization. In other words, there are two public-good problems. The improvement in infratructure to raise transaction efficilency may itself be a public good. However, even if this public-good problem can be overcome through excludability, there is another public-good problem at the level of the increase in the level of specialization that the higher transaction efficiency contrjibutes to. Even with perfect foresight, each individual does not take into account the benefits of a higher level of specialization because that level is determined by the general level of transaction efficiency prevailing in the whole economy, not appreciably affected by that of the individual. Even if, especially after writing this l paper, we correctly foresee that the widespread use of a new communication system This second level of publicness problem is quite impossible to solve through exclusion, as the producers of the new set of products are typically different from the producer of the infrastructure. Thus, the indirect externality of infrastructure may then make the public provision or encouragement desirable. The Yang-Ng framework of inhnarginal analysis is used in the next section to analyse the case for encouraging improvement in transaction efficiency over and above its direct benefitsi Our results are consistent with the empirical evidence that public infrastructure capital has positive long-run effects on output and that 'the short-run rates of return are rather low while the long-run rates of return tend to be quite high' (Demetriades & Mamuneas 2000, p. 689) . It takes time for the degree of specialization to develop.
In the demonstration, we also discovered that the lumpiness in investments to improve transaction efficiency also play a role in creating a divergence between social and private benefits. For non-lumpy investments, the divergence is negligible.
This may also partly explain why big projects may be regarded as a ground for encouragement. Of course, like all other reasonable justification, this one may also be misused to justify really inefficient projects.
A. perspective from the Yang-Ng framework
The Neoclassical economists made an important analytical advance by introducing marginal analysis into economics, with the use of the powerful tool of calculus. This allows problems of resource allocation to be analysed rigorously, with m q y important results. This concentration on resource allocation problems using calculus has been facilitated by the dichotomy of consumers and producers. It also diverted the attention of economists fiom the equally important problems of division of labour, economies of specialization, and economic organization that were emphasized by classical economists including Adarn Smith. Yang & Ng (1993) "attempt to shift the focus back to specialization and the division of labor by abandoning the dichotomy between consumers and producers.. . [and] have provided us with a refreshing new approach to microeconomics, one that has the potential to address many issues that have long resisted formal treatments" (Smythe 1994, p.692).
Abandoning the dichotomy allows the choice of economic organizations (autarky, trade:, firms, hierarchy) to be analysed endogenously from the basic decisions at the individual level.
In contrast to the above-mentioned modelling of specialization at the individual level (detailed below), the earlier papers of Ethier (1982) and Romer (1987) 
U =~, n~~, k~: n ,~~,~, whert: xi is the quantity of good i retained by individual i for self-consumption, Ri is the set of goods purchased from other individuals, I -k is the transaction costs of trade, and 4 is the set of self-provided goods. Each consumer-producer also has a system of production functions, The requirements of market equilibrium (5) and utility equalization to ensure a general equilibrium in the model of ex-anti identical individuals and symmetrical production hnctions for all goods ensure that all prices are equal and may be taken as unity. Thus, maximizing (l) subject to (2) - (4), we have (the detailed working is available from the authors)
n'"-l'" kn-l From (g), it seems that the maximization of u with respect to n yields the optimal number of goods purchased. The optimal value n* is the integer in the neighbourhood of n** that is given by the first-order condition ad& = 0. (It is assumed that c is of sufficient high value to ensure the satisfaction of the second-order condition.) This is in fact the case when everyone in the economy has adjusted to the given set of parametric values (particularly k, c, and a) with no firther opportunity for improvement. However, when a parameter just changes its value, the desired adjustment of an individual is subject to the market opportunity at the time. For example, as the transaction efficiency coefficient k increases, each individual may wish to increase the number of goods purchased fiom others. However, this desire may not be realized before the additional marketable goods are supplied in the market. This problem is especially serious in a realistic model where goods are not symmetrical.
Then, goods (that would have been purchased) may not be supplied in the market soon after an increase in transaction efficiency but before the organizational structure of the whole economy adjusts to the new situation. For example, with higher transaction efficiency, people may want to buy take-away meals and spend less time doing home cooking (a good in the set J) but may not be able to do so before some take-away meals are sold in the market. However, in time, some entrepreneurs will see the opportunity. For example, the MacDonald restaurant was launched with great success.
This changes the structure of economic organization of the society and increases the degree of specialization. People can then spend less time doing home cooking and morle on the specialized profession. However, before the new goods are offered for sale in the market, it is quite impossible that people (including firms) will take account of the specialization-enhancing effect through organizational changes of the whole society in assessing the benefits of higher transaction efficiency. Even assuming that the costs of exclusion is negligible and that there is no fiee-rider problem, a private prodiucer of infrastructure that reduces transaction costs may not be able to capture the indirect benefits of promoting more specialization (even in the absence of individual di&!rences giving rise to different consumer surpluses). People will just assess the benefits of lower transaction costs given the existing level of specialization of the economy. In the framework presented above, it means that people will assess the benefits of a higher k or lower c at given n. Not only that the benefits through a higher n will occur only in the future contingent on the appearance of new marketable goods, but also this development is taken as not affected by the improvement in the transaction efficiency of each individual herself. It is thus rational even under full knovvledge to ignore the indirect benefit of higher transaction efficiency on the level of specialization. In other words, there are two public-good problems. The improvement in in~kastructure to raise transaction efficiency may itself be a public good. However, ever\ if this public-good problem can be overcome through excludability, there is another public-good problem at the level of the increase in the level of specialization that ihe higher transaction efficiency contributes to. Even with perfect foresight, each individual does not take into account the benefits of higher level of specialization because that level is determined by the general level of transaction efficiency previiiling in the whole economy, not appreciably affected by that of a particular individual. In considering whether to buy a mobile phone, an individual only assess the benefits the phone will bring, given the range of marketable goods available. She does not take into account that, if most people have mobile phones and the (full, inclusive of convenience) costs of communication are lower, this may trigger an increase in the range of marketable goods available. This increase depends on the general availability of phones, not on whether she herself has one. Thus, the general possession of phones that reduces communication costs (part of transaction costs) is a public good that may help to increase the level of division of labour. It is this second public-good aspect that this paper is emphasising, not the possibly public-good nature of the infrastructure investment itself.
In terms of (a), the individual benefits of an improvement in transaction efficiency is the increase in utility as either k increases or c decreases. The social benefits include the individual benefits plus the increase in utility from a higher n induced by the increase in k or the reduction in c or both. Consider first an increase in k only, the individual benefit is, from (a),
If we treat n as a continuous variable, the social benefit of an increase in transa.ction efficiency k is given by
If we start from a position where individuals have already adjusted to the given level of k in their choice of n (making M& approximately zero) and for a marginal change in k, the application of the envelope theorem implies that the social benefit is equal to the individual benefit (with of course appropriate summation over the relevant set of individuals where publicness is involved). However, developments in infrastructure is t).pically lumpy and changes in n can only take on integer values. For such changes, social and individual benefits may diverge significantly. Note that lumpiness as such is in~sufficient to give rise to the divergence. If there is no publicness in the network of specialization, the individual will take account of the indirect benefit of a higher k through n, i.e. (Mc%)(dn/dk) in the right hand side of (10) it can be calculated from (8') that U = 12.089466, lower than the original value of 12.093. However, if the lumpy investment is undertaken, the lower value of k will increaser the optimal level of specialization. If the value of n is increased to its new optimal value of 45, the value of U increases to 12.1833 1, making the investment well worth undertaking.
The argument above may be illustrated partially in Figure 1 . The curve U. relates the utility level at different values of n at the original parametric values.
Ignoring the relevant costs, an improvement in transaction efficiency may lift the curve to U,. At the original level of specialization represented by n*o, the gain is AB. If this gain is less than the costs, the net-of-cost curve U2 passes below A. However, there is an additional gain as the level of specialization increases to n*l, possibly making the new optimal point E higher than the original point A. However, evaluating the improvement at the original level of specialization, the private market may. not sanction the improvement even if there is no difficulty in overcoming the first publicgood problem of getting everyone to pay for the change.
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis above is mainly illustrative. The simple functional forms assumed are mainly for simplicity and analytical manageability. They may under or over-estimate the situations in the real world. Thus, the quantitative values have no palrticular real-world significance. For the latter, we have to undertake specific q~lantitative estimates of the real economies, which is beyond the scope of this paper and the competence of its authors. Nevertheless, our analysis does provide a possible ground for the encouragement in lumpy improvements in transaction efficiency, including the provision of infrastructure. More specific policy implications may be obltained after fiuther developments and applications to ascertain the actual situation and estimate the relevant values.
